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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-1475 
____________          
                                       
ERIC C. MCCOLLISTER,  
      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SUPERINTENDENT CAMERON; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY; and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
 
___________                       
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-00525) 
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
___________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 30, 2013 
 
Before:    JORDAN, VANASKIE AND COWEN, Circuit Judges  
 
(Filed: August 15, 2013) 
___________                      
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Eric C. McCollister appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
submitted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We granted a certificate of appealability on the 
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issue of whether McCollister‟s waiver of counsel was made knowingly and intelligently 
in light of the fact that, during the waiver colloquy, he was advised that his sentencing 
range was 40 to 80 years‟ imprisonment, with no mandatory minimum prison term, when 
in fact he faced a mandatory minimum prison term of 25 years and a maximum term of 
life imprisonment under Pennsylvania‟s “three strikes” law, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
9714.  Because the state court‟s rejection of McCollister‟s challenge to the adequacy of 
the waiver of counsel colloquy was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of 
clearly established federal law, we will affirm the District Court‟s denial of McCollister‟s 
habeas petition.  
I. 
We write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural 
history of this case.  Accordingly, we set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis.   
 McCollister was charged with burglary, criminal trespass, robbery, aggravated 
assault, and recklessly endangering another person arising out of a home invasion and 
assault in July of 2006.  Dissatisfied with representation provided by four separate 
attorneys, McCollister requested that he be allowed to represent himself at trial, with 
appointed counsel acting in a standby capacity.  Following a lengthy and comprehensive 
colloquy, during which McCollister was informed that his sentencing exposure was 40 to 
80 years in prison with no mandatory minimum prison term, the trial court accepted the 
waiver of counsel as “knowing, intelligent and voluntary.”  (App. 64.)   
 On May 2, 2008, McCollister was convicted by a jury on all counts.  It was not 
until four months after the jury returned its verdict, however, that the Commonwealth 
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filed a Notice of Intent to Seek Twenty-Five Year Mandatory Sentence due to Conviction 
of Third Violent Crime Offense.  McCollister‟s two prior qualifying offenses included 
burglary of a residence in 1987, and burglary of a residence in 1989.
1
  McCollister was 
sentenced to an aggregate term of 40 years to life imprisonment, including a 25-year 
mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9714 (a)(2).  
McCollister filed a timely direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.    
 On direct appeal, McCollister, among other things, asserted that the waiver of 
counsel colloquy was inadequate because it did not accurately apprise him of the 
sentencing range he faced, including the fact that there would be a mandatory minimum 
prison term of 25 years.  The Superior Court rejected this assertion, explaining: 
[McCollister] contends the court‟s waiver of counsel colloquy did not 
advise him of the permissible sentencing range. . . .  [McCollister] asserts 
he was “confused” and “frustrated” during the colloquy, and the court 
failed to advise him of the potential for a “two strikes” mandatory 
minimum sentence pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. § 9714(a)(2). [McCollister] 
insists he would not have waived his right to counsel at trial if he had 
known his minimum sentence could be mandatory. [McCollister] avers his 
waiver of counsel was involuntary and unknowing. 
*** 
Rule 121 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the 
requirements for an effective waiver of the right to counsel and states in 
pertinent part: 
Rule 121. Waiver of Counsel (A) Generally. 
(1) The defendant may waive the right to be represented by 
counsel. 
                                              
1
 The Commonwealth contends that it was not until after the conclusion of 
McCollister‟s trial that it learned that the structures burglarized by McCollister more than 
twenty years earlier were occupied, triggering the 25-year mandatory minimum prison 
term and maximum prison term of life under Pennsylvania‟s three strikes law.  See 18 
Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(2). 
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(2) To ensure that the defendant's waiver of  the right to 
counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, the judge or 
issuing authority, at a minimum, shall elicit the following 
information from the defendant: 
(a) that the defendant understands that he or she has the right 
to be represented by counsel, and the right to have free 
counsel appointed if the defendant is indigent; 
(b) that the defendant understands the nature of the charges 
against the defendant and the elements of each of those 
charges; 
 (c) that the defendant is aware of the permissible range of 
sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged; 
(d) that the defendant understands that if he or she waives the 
right to counsel, the defendant will still be bound by all the 
normal rules of procedure and that counsel would be familiar 
with these rules; 
(e) that the defendant understands that there are possible 
defenses to these charges that counsel might be aware of, and 
if these defenses are not raised at trial, they may be 
lost permanently; and 
(f) that the defendant understands that, in addition to 
defenses, the defendant has many rights that, if not timely 
asserted, may be lost permanently; and that if errors occur 
and are not timely objected to, or otherwise timely raised by 
the defendant, these errors may be lost permanently. 
*** 
(C) Proceedings Before a Judge. When the defendant seeks to 
waive the right to counsel after the preliminary hearing, the 
judge shall ascertain from the defendant, on the record, 
whether this is a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of 
counsel. 
(D) Standby Counsel. When the defendant's waiver of 
counsel is accepted, standby counsel may be appointed for the 
defendant. Standby counsel shall attend the proceedings and 
shall be available to the defendant for consultation and 
advice.  Pa. R.Crim.P. 121(A), (C), (D).  
 
 “A waiver colloquy must ... always contain a clear demonstration of the 
defendant‟s ability to understand the questions posed to him during the 
colloquy.”  Commonwealth v. McDonough, 571 Pa. 232, 236 n.1, 812 A.2d 
504, 507 n.1 (2002). For example, the court should inquire about the 
defendant‟s age, educational background, and basic comprehension skills. 
Id. 
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After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the [Trial Judge], we 
conclude [McCollister‟s] issues merit no relief.  The trial court opinion 
comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions 
presented. (See Trial Court Opinion at 4-24 (finding ... [McCollister‟s 
waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent and voluntary where (a) court 
conducted meticulous colloquy record, informing [McCollister] of nature of 
charges and permissible range of sentences for offenses charged, (b) court 
advised [McCollister] of his right to object to evidence, but court had no 
duty to teach [McCollister] laws of evidence, (c) [McCollister] had 
opportunity to state on the record that he was confused, but instead chose to 
participate in colloquy, (d) [McCollister] stated under oath and on the 
record that no one had forced or threatened him to waive counsel, and that 
no one had promised him anything in exchange for his waiver, (e) 
ultimately [McCollister] stated three times under oath that he desired to 
waive his right to counsel.)) 
 
 (Commonwealth v. McCollister, No. 1401 EDA 2009, pp. 14, 20-22 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 
30, 2010) (Memorandum)). 
 On January 25, 2011, McCollister filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus.  Among the issues presented in the habeas petition was that he was denied his 
right to counsel because the plea colloquy did not accurately set forth the sentencing 
range to which he was exposed, including the 25 year mandatory minimum prison term 
under Pennsylvania‟s three strikes rule.  The Magistrate Judge to whom the § 2254 
petition was referred recommended denial of relief on this claim, observing that the state 
court‟s finding that the waiver colloquy was adequate “is neither contrary to, nor an 
unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court precedent.”  (October 18, 2011 
Report and Recommendation at 31.)  The District Court overruled McCollister‟s 
objections to the Report and Recommendation and denied the habeas petition.  This 
appeal followed.   
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 On August 27, 2012, we granted McCollister‟s request for a certificate of 
appealability solely on the issue of whether his waiver of right to trial counsel was made 
knowingly and intelligently.  We also appointed counsel to represent McCollister on 
appeal.
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II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28  U.S.C. § 2241(a) and  § 2254(a).  We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and  § 2253(c)(1).   
 Where, as here, a state court has decided the merits of a petitioner‟s habeas claim, 
relief  in federal court may be granted only if the state court‟s adjudication of the claim: 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to or involved in an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law, as determined 
by the Supreme Court of the United States; 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 
Court proceeding. 
 
28 U.S.C.  § 2254(d)(1), (2).  In this case, the facts are not in dispute, and McCollister 
does not contend that the state court‟s determination of his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel claim was contrary to a precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States.  
Instead, he limits his argument to the assertion that the state court rejection of his Sixth 
Amendment claim represented an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 
law.   
 The starting point of analysis in a case such as this “is to identify the „clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States‟ that 
                                              
2
 We acknowledge with appreciation the fine efforts of court-appointed counsel in 
presenting arguments on behalf of McCollister. 
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governs the habeas petitioner‟s claims.”  Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1449 
(2013).  The Supreme Court has clearly established that there is a right to waive counsel 
and proceed pro se, provided that the waiver is knowing and voluntary.  See Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806, 814 (1975).  See also Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87-88 
(2004).  The Supreme Court, however, “ha[s] not . . . prescribed any formula or script to 
be read to a defendant who states that he elects to proceed without counsel.”  Tovar, 541 
U.S. at 88.  Specifically, there is no Supreme Court precedent holding that the failure to 
apprise a defendant of a potential statutory mandatory minimum prison term renders a 
waiver of counsel unknowing or involuntary.  Nor is there any High Court ruling that 
erroneous advice pertaining to the sentencing range faced by the defendant renders that 
defendant‟s waiver of counsel invalid.   
What the Supreme Court has required is that the defendant “be made aware of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that „he 
knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.‟”  Faretta, 422 U.S. at 
835.  The comprehensive colloquy undertaken by the Trial Judge in this case leaves no 
doubt that McCollister made his decision to waive representation by counsel with his 
eyes wide open.  McCollister knew that he faced an aggregate prison range of 40 to 80 
years in prison, which, effectively, is the prison term he received.  While not informed 
that the maximum prison term could be life, this omission was inconsequential in view of 
McCollister‟s age at the time of the plea colloquy (39 years-old.)   Moreover, the 
statutory mandatory minimum came into play only upon the Commonwealth‟s filing of 
its notice of intention to proceed under the Pennsylvania three strikes law, and 
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Pennsylvania law only requires that such notice be given after a conviction.  See 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9714(d).  Thus, at the time of the colloquy, the sentencing range 
information communicated to McCollister was accurate.  Under these circumstance, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court‟s determination that McCollister validly waived his right to 
counsel is not an unreasonable application of  precedents of the Supreme Court of the 
United States.   
 McCollister‟s reliance upon our decisions in United States v. Booker, 684 F.3d 
421 (3d Cir. 2012), United States v. Jones, 452 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2006), and United 
States v. Moskovits, 86 F.3d 1303 (3d Cir. 1996), is unavailing.  Although those 
decisions, which involved direct appellate court review of the validity of a waiver of 
counsel, bear some factual similarities to McCollister‟s situation, they cannot “be used to 
refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal 
rule that [the Supreme] Court has not announced.”  Marshall, 133 S. Ct. at 1450.  It is 
only the precedents of our High Court that set the boundaries of our review of the validity 
of a state court conviction.  See id. at 1450-51 (“Although an appellate panel may, in 
accordance with its usual law-of-the-circuit procedures, look to circuit precedent to 
ascertain whether it has already held that the particular point in issue is clearly 
established by Supreme Court precedent, it may not canvass circuit decisions to 
determine whether a particular rule of law is so widely accepted among the Federal 
Circuits that it would, if presented to this Court, be accepted as correct.”) (Citations 
omitted.)  In light of the fact that the Supreme Court has not held that the omission of 
information pertaining to a statutory mandatory minimum or an inconsequential error 
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with respect to the maximum prison term voids an otherwise effective waiver of counsel, 
it cannot be said that the Pennsylvania Superior Court‟s ruling in this case is “an 
unreasonable application of the „general standard[s]‟ established by the Court‟s 
assistance- of-counsel cases.”  Id.at 1450   
  
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment.  
